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A recent review of US energy research and development identi!ed a persistent under-investment in building, indus-trial and vehicle end-use e"ciency compared with invest-
ment in a clean electricity supply1. #is emphasis on innovation of 
energy-supply technologies is not peculiar to the US. #e EU and 
the major developing countries, as well as the US, allocate around 
two thirds of public R&D budgets to energy-supply technologies1–3.
Directed innovation e$orts for climate change mitigation are 
not limited to public R&D investments. #ey involve broader pro-
cesses of knowledge generation and exchange; are guided by stra-
tegic plans, technology roadmaps, and research collaborations; 
are dependent on leveraged private sector resources; and they are 
reinforced by experiences with technologies once commercialized. 
Directed innovation e$orts thus permeate the entire system of inno-
vation for energy technologies.
#e aim of this Perspective is to assess the balance between 
energy supply and end-use technologies for directed innovation 
e$orts in response to the challenge of climate change mitigation. 
First, we develop an analytical framework that integrates the key 
elements of the innovation system. Second, we apply this analytical 
framework to energy technologies using a broad set of indicators 
that characterize a diverse range of innovation processes. In particu-
lar, we assess whether inputs into the innovation system are aligned 
with observed outputs. We also consider required innovation out-
comes in an emissions-constrained world, drawing on large-scale 
modelling studies that !nd e"cient end-use technologies may con-
tribute the majority of cumulative emission reductions to 21004. 
#ird, we o$er a viewpoint on the reasons for our central empirical 
!nding: energy end-use technologies are pervasively marginalized 
in directed innovation e$orts.
#e distinction between energy-supply and end-use technolo-
gies is widely used in energy systems analysis, management and 
policy5. Energy-supply technologies are used to extract, process, 
transport and convert energy resources into a form useful to end-
users. #e emphasis of innovation e$orts for reducing emissions 
from the energy supply is to develop and deploy low or zero car-
bon-supply options6–8. End-use technologies are used to convert 
energy into a useful !nal service like heating, mobility or commu-
nication. #e emphasis of innovation e$orts for reducing emissions 
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in end-use is twofold: to improve the energy e"ciency of devices 
and applications; and to substitute for energy-intensive forms of 
service provision9,10. Fuel-e"cient vehicles and mode-shi%ing from 
car to public transport are examples, respectively. We use this sim-
ple dichotomy between energy-supply and end-use technologies to 
characterize and assess directed innovation e$orts.
Key elements of the innovation system
A comprehensive review of the literature on energy innovation was 
recently completed as part of the Global Energy Assessment11, and 
concluded that a systemic perspective on innovation was necessary 
to account for the complex interdependencies between di$erent 
innovation stages, processes and drivers (Fig. 1).
#e review also found that innovation analyses and policies are 
o%en partial, focusing only on selected elements of the innovation 
system. For analyses, this can mean biased or decontextualized !nd-
ings, and for policies guiding broader innovation e$orts, partiality 
can lead to unintended or adverse consequences.
#e early years of the wind-power industry in the 1970s and 80s 
is a useful case in point. In countries like Sweden, the Netherlands 
and Germany, public R&D programmes pushed for step-change 
advances in large-scale, high-e"ciency turbines12,13, but limited 
attention was paid to stimulating market demand, and the energy 
utilities proved reluctant adopters of these unproven innovations14. 
In Denmark, by comparison, R&D programmes emphasized 
smaller-scale reliable turbines whose commercial adoption was 
supported by investment and production subsidies. Developers and 
landowners became actively engaged in the process of commercial 
deployment alongside the manufacturers15. Institutions like the 
national testing and certi!cation station at Risø provided a means 
of exchanging knowledge and user experiences within the innova-
tion system16.
Denmark’s systemic approach to wind-power innovation led to 
its world-leading position in manufacturing and market growth. #e 
selective and partial focus of its early rivals on pushing novel tech-
nologies from R&D labs into the market failed to integrate potential 
adopters and failed to direct broader processes of knowledge gener-
ation and exchange. In the Global Energy Assessment11, many other 
cases of innovation success are covered, such as the Brazilian ethanol 
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and 'ex-fuel car industry17, as are cases of innovation failure, such 
as the US ‘synfuels’ programme to develop liquid or gaseous substi-
tutes for petroleum18. In each case, the successes are distinguished 
by the systemic characteristic of directed innovation e$orts.
To assess directed innovation e$orts for climate change 
mitigation, we developed an analytical framework integrating key 
elements of the innovation system as applied to energy technologies 
(Fig. 1). At the centre of this analytical framework are the stages of 
innovation during a technology’s lifecycle from R&D, through dem-
onstration projects and niche markets, to di$usion and ultimate 
phase-out. Innovation processes link these stages. Once considered 
unidirectional, with innovation driven strongly by basic research19, 
these innovation processes are now understood to include feed-
backs as well as 'ows20,21. As an example, knowledge generated 
through R&D activities 'ows through into the design of commer-
cial prototypes, which are tested in niche markets protected from 
full commercial pressures22. #e experiences of technology users 
then feed back into the iterative process of technology development 
and improvement.
#e innovation lifecycle is driven by forces of both supply and 
demand. ‘Technology-push’ drivers reduce the costs of innovation 
through, for example, education and research; ‘market-pull’ drivers 
increase the pay-o$s from innovation, for example, by improving 
the relative advantage of new technologies in the market place23.#e 
stages and drivers of the innovation lifecycle for a particular tech-
nology play out within a broader innovation system.
Of the elements shown in Fig.  1, knowledge is the most fun-
damental24, and includes processes of generation and learning25. 
#ese, in turn, involve many actors and institutions. Actors are 
diverse, from entrepreneurs and established !rms to research 
organizations, governments and end-users. Innovation is thus a 
collective activity, supported by many institutions. #e institutions 
emphasized in our analytical framework are twofold: the propensity 
of entrepreneurs to invest in risky innovation activities with uncer-
tain pay-o$s; and shared expectations around an innovation’s future 
trajectory26–28. Other important and related institutions include law, 
markets and public policy. Public resources are invested directly 
into speci!c innovation stages, or are used to leverage private sec-
tor resources through regulatory or market incentives structured by 
public policy29,30.
Knowledge, actors and institutions, and resources encapsulate 
the key elements of the innovation system (see Fig. 1). #ese ele-
ments emphasize necessary inputs into the innovation system to 
ensure its successful functioning. #e ultimate measure of success 
for a particular technology is its widespread adoption and use. 
#is output of the innovation system is also the means towards 
broader outcomes of interest such as climate change mitigation. 
New technologies successfully di$use as a function of their relative 
advantage over incumbent technologies31. For energy technologies, 
this can be measured by the di$erence in cost and performance of 
energy service provision in terms of quality, versatility, environmen-
tal impact and so on32. Many of these attributes of relative advantage 
can be shaped by public policy as well as the other elements of the 
innovation system.
Innovation systems research has typically paid less attention to 
the di$usion and use of technology33. Yet the needs and preferences 
of technology adopters distinguish innovation successes from fail-
ures34. Technology adoption and use are also strongly interdepend-
ent with the knowledge, actors and institutions, and resources of the 
innovation system27,30.
Indicators of directed innovation e"orts
To assess directed innovation e$orts in response to climate 
change mitigation needs, we compiled a set of indicators describ-
ing all the key elements of our analytical framework for the 
innovation system. #e di$erent stages, processes and drivers of 
innovation represented in Fig. 1 thus provide the sample space for 
our indicators. Table 1 shows how our categories of indicators map 
onto these elements. For the indicators in each of these categories, 
we contrast the proportion of e$ort directed at energy-supply and 
energy end-use technologies.
Inputs to the innovation system
To characterize inputs to the innovation system, we use indicators 
of: analysis and modelling; technology roadmaps, collaborations, 
portfolios and programmes; public research, development and 
demonstration (RD&D) investments; and niche market invest-
ments (Table 2). #e correspondence between these indicators and 
our analytical framework is shown in Table 1.
Analysis and modelling are knowledge-generation activities 
that underpin our evolving understanding of the potential contri-
bution of technological change to mitigating climate change (see 
indicators I1.1–1.6 in Table  2). Technology roadmaps (I2.1–2.4), 
collaborative research ventures (I3.1–3.4), and technology portfo-
lios, programmes and training (I4.1–4.4) are all in'uential public 
institutions that frame and direct innovation e$orts. #ey also help 
build shared expectations and support entrepreneurial risk-taking 
“by crystallising the vision of all stakeholders around the common 
objectives constituted by the roadmaps”2. Public resource inputs to 
the innovation system change over the innovation lifecycle from 
directly investing in research and development activities (I5.1–5.8) 
to structuring incentives in speci!c market niches to attract pri-
vate capital. We capture the leveraging of private resources by these 
directed e$orts through additional indicators of niche market 
investments (I6.1–6.3).
Almost without exception, the indicators of innovation system 
inputs in Table  2 are strongly weighted towards energy-supply 
technologies (see column ‘End-use as % of total’). #is !nding is 
most robust for the public RD&D investment indicators that we 
consider to o$er good coverage both spatially and in terms of sam-
ple space (see Methods for details). Figure 2 extends the indicators 
I5–I6 by summarizing available data on direct public expenditures 
as well as the leveraging e$ect of public policy and expenditures 
on private investments in niche markets. Energy-supply technolo-
gies are disaggregated to distinguish resource extraction from con-
version (for example, electricity generation), and renewable from 
fossil-fuel technologies.
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Figure 1 | An analytical framework of the innovation system for energy 
technologies. This stylistic representation of the innovation system 
includes the following key elements: innovation stages (grey double-
headed arrows, illustrating the importance of feedbacks between stages); 
innovation drivers (green rhombi and block arrows); and innovation 
processes (blue and brown frame). Drivers and processes more 
characteristic of innovation inputs (blue frame) are distinguished from 
those more characteristic of innovation outputs (brown frame). Innovation 
outcomes are also shown (orange arrow).
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Although Fig.  2 is a partial snapshot of directed innovation 
expenditure, it usefully illustrates two further points. First, the 
magnitude of subsidy for fossil-fuel consumption, estimated to 
approach $500 billion35, dwarfs innovation investments of some 
$160 billion in a post-fossil-fuel energy supply. Second, renewable 
electricity supply (predominantly wind and solar PV) and ‘smart’ 
grid technologies dominate public support in the early RD&D and 
niche market stages of the innovation lifecycle. Directed innovation 
e$orts are therefore ‘pushing’ energy-supply technologies to mitigate 
climate change into a market occupied by heavily subsidized incum-
bents. E"cient end-use technologies are marginalized throughout.
Outputs & outcomes of the innovation system
Table 2 and Fig. 2 illustrate the pervasiveness of privilege accorded to 
energy-supply technologies in directed innovation e$orts. An innova-
tion system with knowledge, institutional and resource inputs heavily 
weighted towards energy-supply technologies might be expected to 
produce similarly weighted outputs. To characterize outputs of the 
innovation system, we use indicators of market di$usion, learning 
and social returns on investment. We include a fourth set of indi-
cators for the broader outcome of interest: mitigation potentials of 
energy technologies across a range of climate stabilization scenarios.
Table 3 summarizes the indicators. #e correspondence between 
these indicators and our analytical framework is shown in Table 1. 
Widespread commercial application of energy technologies con-
tributes directly to mitigation. End-use technologies dominate mar-
ket di$usion in terms of both capital invested in the energy system 
(see indicators O1.1–1.3 in Table 3) and energy conversion capacity 
(O1.4–1.5).
Di$usion is driven by improving performance and decreasing 
costs associated with learning processes (O2.1–2.2). #e e$ects of 
learning are o%en measured by the percentage unit cost reduction per 
successive doubling of cumulative capacity or production as a proxy 
for experience36,37. Mean learning rates in a sample of mass-produced 
energy end-use technologies such as refrigerators or automobiles are 
twice as high as for large-scale energy-supply technologies such as 
nuclear reactors or gas turbines. Moreover, learning rates for large-
scale energy-supply technologies reported in the literature confound 
learning e$ects with scale economies, which also reduce unit costs 
as technologies mature and increase in size. Actual learning rates for 
energy-supply technologies are therefore likely to be over-estimated.
Learning rates describe technology-speci!c consequences of inno-
vation system processes. Social returns on investment capture broader 
economic, environmental and energy security bene!ts, among oth-
ers. Estimating social returns is methodologically complex38 and so is 
o%en not attempted39. Two landmark studies in the US did, however, 
estimate the social bene!ts of federal energy RD&D expenditure40,41. 
#e ratio of all realized bene!ts to total programme costs from 1978–
2000 was 83:1 for e"cient end-use technologies compared with 7:1 
for fossil-fuel energy-supply technologies (see indicators O3.1–3.2 
in Table 3)40. Not only did end-use e"ciency programmes dominate 
the top rankings of bene!t:cost ratios (O3.3), they were also the least 
costly in the event of unsuccessful commercialization42. A subsequent 
study estimated the expected future bene!t:cost ratios for ongoing 
technology programmes at 10:1 for end-use e"ciency and 4:1 for 
fossil-fuel energy supply41. Under assumptions of future carbon pric-
ing, the bene!t:cost ratio for e"cient end-use technologies improved 
further to 12:1 (O3.4–3.5).
Almost without exception, the indicators of innovation system 
outputs in Table 3 are strongly weighted towards end-use technolo-
gies (see column ‘End-use as % of total’). #is !nding is most robust 
for the learning and social returns categories, which we consider to 
o$er good coverage of the sample space.
Table 3 also includes indicators of future mitigation potentials 
based on scenario analyses (O4.1–4.3). #e respective contribu-
tion of any technology to climate change mitigation is inherently 
uncertain. Salient uncertainties include baseline growth in energy 
demand, climate targets, and mitigation technologies and costs. Of 
these, baseline uncertainties are the most important4,43. As miti-
gation analysis is by de!nition relative to a baseline or reference 
scenario, assumptions embedded in that baseline are inevitably 
in'uential. Yet baselines are rarely consistent in their treatment of 
energy-supply and end-use technologies. Although the trend of 
improving end-use e"ciency is invariably extended into the future, 
the trend of decreasing carbon intensity is not (for example, Fig. 3 
in ref. 44). #e apparent contribution of end-use technologies to 
Table 1 | Indicators of Directed Innovation E!orts.
Analytical framework: Key elements of the innovation system
Stages Drivers Processes
Categories of indicator 
(distinguishing innovation system 
inputs and outputs)
 
RD&D 
stages
Niche 
market 
stage
Diffusion 
& phase-
out stages
 
Technology-
push drivers
 
Market-
pull drivers
 
 
Knowledge
 
Actors & 
institutions
 
 
Resources
Technology 
adoption  
& use
Inputs
I1 Analysis & Modelling orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
I2 Technology Roadmaps orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
I3 Technology Collaborations orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
I4 Portfolios & Programmes orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
I5 RD&D Investments orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
I6 Niche Market Investments orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
Outputs
O1 Market Diffusion orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
O2 Learning Rates orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
O3 Social Returns on Investment orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
O4 Mitigation Potentials† orn orn orn orn orn orn orn orn
Columns show the analytical framework of key elements of the innovation system (see Fig. 1). Rows show categories of indicator sampled to characterize the innovation system. Cells containing stars denote 
elements of analytical framework covered by each category of indicator. The number of stars indicates the strength of coverage of each indicator. †The broader outcome of interest, or the end for which the 
innovation outputs are the means.
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reported mitigation potentials is therefore reduced, as the baseline 
already includes substantial e"ciency gains (for example, Fig.  5 
in ref. 45).
#e exclusion of end-use e"ciency from mitigation analyses due 
to its inclusion in baseline assumptions is not just a characteristic of 
modelling studies. For similar reasons, the in'uential work on climate 
‘stabilization wedges’ only included a limited subset of end-use 
technologies (relating to cars and buildings) despite recognizing 
that e"ciency improvements o$ered the greatest potential source of 
emission reductions46.
To compare potential contributions to mitigation of energy-sup-
ply and end-use technologies on a like-for-like basis, the baseline 
Table 2 | Indicators of Innovation System Inputs.
 
Indicator
 
Units
 
Supply
 
End-Use
 
Other
End-use as 
% of total
Spatial 
scale 
Spatial 
coverage
Sample 
coverage
I1 Analysis & Modelling M L/M
I1.1 Technological resolution of 11 IAMs in 3 climate 
stabilization studies 43–45
# IAMs 11 3 n/a 21% Gbl H M
I1.2 Technological resolution of 6 modelling studies of 
energy system transitions 78
# studies 6 4 n/a 40% Gbl H L
I1.3 Restricted technology portfolio analysis in 4 climate 
stabilization studies 43,44,79,80
# scenarios 21 2 1 8% Gbl H M
I1.4 Restricted technology portfolio analysis in UK 
transition pathways 81
# analyses 4 1 0 20% UK L L
I1.5 Technological focus of energy research published over 
10 years in 3 specialist energy journals 55
% of articles 
(total >100%)
84 31 59 18% Gbl* H M
I1.6 Focus of 245 learning rate estimates in 2 review  
studies 36,82
# learning rates 171 86 0 33% Gbl* H H
I2 Technology Roadmaps L L
I2.1 EU SET-Plan strategic technologies 83 # technologies 12 4 5 19% EU M L
I2.2 EU SET-Plan R&D review of priority technologies 84 # technologies 7 0 2 0% EU M L
I2.3 European Industrial Initiatives 83 # initiatives 5 1 1 14% EU M L
I2.4 US DoE Quadrennial Technology Review  technology 
roadmaps 85
# roadmaps 8 5 4 29% US L L
I3 Technology Collaborations M L/M
I3.1 US Energy Innovation Hubs, established & proposed 86 # hubs 3 1 2 17% US L L
I3.2 US-China Clean Energy Research Centre work plans 87 # plans 1 2 0 67% US-China M L/u
I3.3 IEA Implementing Agreements 88 # agreements 24 11 7 26% Gbl H M
I3.4 cf. I3.3 but country participation 88 # countries 267 149 94 29% Gbl H M
I4 Technology Portfolios & Programmes L L/u
I4.1 EU FP7 energy research programme activities 1 # activities 5 1 4 10% EU M L/u
I4.2 EU FP7 energy research themes in 2011 1 # themes 13 3 6 14% EU M L/u
I4.3 US ARPA-E research projects 89 # projects 66 36 79 20% US L L
I4.4 UK energy research doctoral training centres 90 # centres 7 1 4 8% UK L L/u
I5 Public RD&D Investments H H
I5.1 EU FP7 energy research budget in 2011 1 € million 161 35 72 13% EU M L/M
I5.2 EU FP6 energy research budget in 2002-6 84 € billion 1.8 0.1 0.2 5% EU M L/M
I5.3 European Industrial Initiatives funding 39 € million 47 10 2 17% EU M L/u
I5.4 UK energy research programme funding as of 2011 90 £ million 200 100 89 26% UK L L
I5.5 US ARPA-E research project funding 89 $ million 211 101 209 19% US L L
I5.6 IEA public RD&D investments in 2008 66 $ billion 7.9 1.7 3.1 13% Dev-d M H
I5.7 BRIMCS public RD&D investments in 2008 3 $ billion 8.3 0.2 5.3 1% Dev-d M M
I5.8 cf. I5.6 but cumulative 1974-2007 66 $ billion 315 38 65 9% Dev-d M H
I6 Niche Market Investments H u
I6.1 Global asset finance investment in energy niche 
markets in 2008 91
$ billion 17 2 92 2% Gbl H u
I6.2 Global venture capital investment in energy niche 
markets in 2008 91
$ billion 4.6 2.8 7.6 19% Gbl H u
I6.3 cf. I6.2 but cumulative 2002-2008 91 $ billion 13 8 22 19% Gbl H u
Subjective assessments of spatial coverage globally, regionally and nationally, and sample coverage of full potential set of indicators: high (H), medium (M), low (L) coverage, or unknown (u) if insufficient data 
exist to assess coverage. See Methods section and Supplementary Information for details and additional input indicators. Gbl = Global. Gbl* = Global with English-speaking language bias77. Dev-d = Developed 
countries, typically IEA members. Dev-g = Developing countries. Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E); Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, China, South Africa (BRIMCS); Department of Energy (DoE); 
Framework Programme (FP); Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs); International Energy Agency (IEA); Research, development & demonstration (RD&D); Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan). 
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needs to hold end-use e"ciency constant at current levels4,47. One 
large-scale modelling study that made this adjustment found 
e"cient end-use technologies accounted for 58–75% of cumula-
tive emission reductions to 2100, with an average of around 60% 
(ref. 4). #ese provide the outcome indicators (O4.1–4.3) shown 
in Table 3.
Even studies that do not correct for the over-estimation of 
energy-supply contributions still !nd e"cient end-use technologies 
constitute an important, if not the dominant, mitigation option44. 
A review of mitigation scenarios to 2050 in six countries found 
end-use e"ciency contributed 42–89% of emission reductions 
with a mean of 63% (see Table 3.8 in ref. 48). Moreover, the relative 
importance of end-use technologies increased both in nearer-term 
scenarios and under less stringent stabilization  targets43,49.
Input–output asymmetries in the innovation system
Taken together, the indicators summarized in Tables 2 and 3 char-
acterize the di$erent stages, processes and drivers of innovation in 
the energy system. Figure 3 compares representative indicators of 
innovation inputs (Fig. 3a) with outputs and outcomes (Fig. 3b). 
Directed innovation e$orts clearly privilege energy-supply technol-
ogies (indicators I1-6). Yet end-use technologies dominate innova-
tion system outputs (indicators O1-3) and the required outcomes 
for climate change mitigation (indicators O4).
End-use technologies dominate system outputs for vari-
ous reasons. End-use e"ciency is economically attractive as it 
reduces lifecycle costs and so improves productivity50,51. It also 
o$ers ‘co-bene!ts’ ranging from reduced import dependence and 
reduced price volatility to reduced air pollution and better-quality 
energy services52.
#ese generic advantages of end-use e"ciency are comple-
mented by technology-speci!c potentials. In the context of learn-
ing, each technological unit invested in and adopted can be seen 
as an experiment: the more experiments that take place, the higher 
the potential for learning (all else held constant). #is favours dis-
persed, small-scale end-use technologies as a source of potential 
cost reduction to drive widespread di$usion. End-use technolo-
gies are also the !nal link in an energy-conversion chain whose 
purpose is to provide useful services to end-users. Many end-use 
technologies are produced, marketed and sold in consumer goods 
markets characterized by non-directed private activity (in compari-
son to the regulated energy-supply sector). #e relative advantage 
of end-use innovations has proved central to changes in the energy 
system observed over time32.
In summary, e"cient end-use technologies occupy a greater 
share of energy system investments and capacity, engage higher lev-
els of private-sector activity, o$er higher potential cost reductions, 
return larger social bene!ts and promise greater future mitigation 
of climate change.
Why Are Energy End-Use Technologies Marginalized?
In this section, we o$er our perspective on the reasons for the privi-
leging within directed innovation e$orts of energy-supply tech-
nologies over e"cient end-use technologies. We emphasize from 
the outset that this is our interpretation of the data rather than a 
!nding substantiated by the data. Our perspective is also neces-
sarily general and does not distinguish the institutional and politi-
cal di$erences between innovation systems at di$erent scales for 
di$erent technologies29.
#ese caveats notwithstanding, we consider four possible argu-
ments to explain why end-use technologies may be marginalized in 
directed innovation e$orts: analytical intractability; invisibility and 
dispersion; weak political economic in'uence; and bounded inno-
vation heuristics.
First, end-use technologies are smaller in scale, orders of mag-
nitude larger in number, more dispersed, and highly heteroge-
neous compared with the pits, pipelines and power plants of the 
energy supply. Data are correspondingly patchy or unavailable 
(see p437 in ref.  53). Many end-use technologies are also con-
sumer goods with a variety of attributes over which end-user pref-
erences vary. E"ciency may be traded-o$ against style, speed and 
safety54. With engineering as the dominant disciplinary approach 
to energy research55, these ‘behavioural’ characteristics of end-use 
technology adoption pose greater problems for modellers and 
analysts. Most widely used integrated assessment models do not 
resolve end-use technologies. Energy assessments can exclude 
them all  together56.
Second, the scale and visibility of statuesque wind turbines or 
monumental engineering constructions engender achievement 
and capture attention57. China’s vast new coal-to-liquids facility is 
a recent case in point58. Renewables, nuclear and carbon capture 
hog the headlines of a low-carbon future. #e Greenpeace-funded 
scenario that sparked controversy in the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation depicted 77% of global energy 
needs in 2050 being supplied by renewables59,60. Yet among the 
160+ scenarios reviewed, it was an outlier not for its assumptions 
about renewable technology deployment but for its assumptions 
about end-use e"ciency and energy demand61,62. #is went unno-
ticed. #e end use of energy is largely invisible, and incremental 
e"ciency improvements dispersed over many hundreds of end-
use innovations are somehow “less tangible”46.
#ird, the fossil-fuel-dominated energy supply has been 
described as a ‘techno-institutional complex’ that has become locked 
in63. As interrelated technological and social systems evolve, they 
develop increasing institutional rigidity and resistance to change64. 
Established infrastructures and rules create barriers to entry. Vested 
interests exert political and market pressure to preserve the domi-
nant position of incumbent technologies. Energy-supply companies 
are among the largest, most capitalized corporate interests in the 
world. In contrast, end-use technologies lack coherent in'uence in 
the political economy. #ere are no simple metrics to substantiate 
this contention, but it is indicative that fossil-fuel industry revenues 
are on the order of $5 trillion annually, whereas the largest energy 
end-use technology industry — automobiles — has revenues of $1.5 
trillion (ref. 65).
End-use
Conversion
Resource
RD&D
Niche
markets Di!usion Phase-out
8
15 15 100 500
20>>21212
5
Stage of innovation lifecycle
Su
pp
ly
En
d-
us
e
? ?
? ?
?
?
E"cient end-use
Renewables (supply)
Fossil fuel (supply)
Other (including nuclear grids)
40
Size of symbols proportional
to resources mobilized 
(labels in $billion or ? 
if unknown)
En
er
gy
 te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
Figure 2 | Global mobilization of financial resources for energy 
technologies. Energy e$ciency improvements in end-use technologies 
(green).Energy resource extraction and conversion disaggregated into 
fossil-fuel (brown), renewable (blue), and nuclear, network and storage 
(grey) technologies (see Supplementary Information for details). The 
phase-out stage of the innovation lifecycle is included to highlight its 
importance for capital stock retirement and replacement (that allows for 
growth of post-fossil-fuel alternatives); however, insu$cient data exist to 
populate its cells.
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Fourth, directed innovation e$orts in the energy system until 
now have cumulatively reinforced the dominant in'uence of the 
energy-supply industry over its end-use counterparts. Since the 
late-nineteenth century, for every $1 in US federal subsidies to 
e"cient end-use technologies, $35 have gone to energy-supply 
technologies66. Since 1974, more public resources in developed 
countries have been invested into RD&D of nuclear fusion than 
on all e"cient end-use technologies combined47,67. #e search for 
solutions in evolving innovation systems becomes limited by pre-
vailing practices, ways of thinking, and expectations, conceptual-
ized as a ‘technological trajectory’68. For energy innovation, this 
trajectory points !rmly towards the energy supply. Proponents 
of a R&D-led mitigation strategy conclude “there should be no 
need to pick ‘winners’ or to get locked into inferior technolo-
gies”69 before citing six ‘neutral’ technology options worthy of 
R&D support; !ve of the six relate to the energy supply. Silver 
bullets of radical innovation for single-handedly tackling cli-
mate change are similarly sought only in low cost, limitless, zero 
carbon supply or geo-engineering technologies7. Analogous 
silver ‘buckshot’ strategies distributing solutions across many 
heterogenous end-use technologies are considered less applica-
ble, with greater perceived di"culties in scaling a breakthrough 
to make a large contribution to emissions reduction via private 
sector investment.
The Importance of Assessing Innovation Systems
Our analysis reveals a pronounced and pervasive asymmetry in the 
innovation system for energy technologies seen through the lens 
of climate change mitigation. Whereas the outputs of innovation 
emphasize the importance of e"cient end-use technologies, inputs 
privilege energy-supply technologies. Directed innovation e$orts 
are misaligned with their required outcomes. Our conclusion is that 
signi!cantly greater e$ort is needed to develop the full potential of 
e"cient end-use technologies.
#e allocation of public resources to innovation is ultimately 
political70. A diversi!ed portfolio of mitigation options preserves 
option value and insures against the risk of particular innovation 
failures71. But concentrating scarce resources in a more narrowly 
focused investment strategy can harness the bene!ts of scale through 
a virtuous cycle of learning, cost reduction, standardization, network 
expansion, further scaling, and so on72. #e merits of diversi!cation 
and concentration in portfolio design should be argued openly for 
energy-supply and end-use technologies with clear criteria.
Our analytical framework provides such criteria and ensures 
e$orts are matched to requirements, or directed inputs to resulting 
outputs and outcomes. #e Department of Energy’s Quadrennial 
Technology Review of energy innovation in the US used a similarly 
comprehensive and transparent approach1. It concluded that the 
US federal portfolio needed “rebalancing” in large part towards 
Table 3 | Indicators of Innovation System Outputs and Outcomes.
 
Indicator
 
Units
 
Supply
 
End-Use
 
Other
End-use as 
% of total
Spatial 
scale
Spatial 
coverage
Sample 
coverage
O1 Market Diffusion H M
O1.1 Global capital investments in 2005, central 
estimates 92–4
$ trillion 0.8 1.7 n/a 68% Gbl H M
O1.2 cf. O1.1 but with low estimate for end-use 92–4 $ trillion 0.8 1.0 n/a 55% Gbl H M
O1.3 cf. O1.1 but with high estimate for end-use 92–4 $ trillion 0.8 3.5 n/a 82% Gbl H M
O1.4 US installed energy conversion capacity in 2000 95 TW 3.4 30 n/a 90% US L M
O1.5 cf. O1.4 but excluding cars 96 TW 3.4 5.5 n/a 62% US L M
O2 Learning Rates H H
O2.1 Average learning rates for mass produced end-use 
technologies (n=14) & large-scale energy supply 
technologies (n=14) 11,17,36,96–107
% learning rate 8 20 n/a 71% Gbl* H H
O2.2 cf O2.1 but excluding nuclear power  11,17,36,96–107 % learning rate 12 20 n/a 62% Gbl* H H
O3 Social Returns on Investment L M
O3.1 Realised economic benefits & costs of US federal 
RD&D in 28 technologies from 1978-2000 40
share of benefits / 
share of costs †
0.3 21 n/a 99% US L L
O3.2 cf. O3.1 but including environmental and security 
benefits as well as economic benefits 40
share of benefits / 
share of costs †
0.7 9.1 n/a 93% US L M
O3.3 Benefit:cost ratios of US federal RD&D in 16 
commercialised technologies from 1978-2000 42
share of top 5 B:C 
ratios / share of 
all ratios
0.3 2.1 n/a 87% US L M
O3.4 Expected economic benefits & costs of US federal 
RD&D in 5 technologies from 2006-2050 41
share of benefits / 
share of costs †
0.7 1.8 n/a 73% US L M
O3.5 cf. O3.4 but in carbon constrained scenario 41 share of benefits / 
share of costs †
0.5 1.7 n/a 77% US L M
O4 Mitigation Potentials H L
O4.1 Cumulative emission reductions from 2000-2100 
relative to constant year 2000 baseline 4,47
1,000 GtC 0.9 1.7 0.2 59% Gbl H L
O4.2 cf. O4.1 but minimum emission reductions 4,47 1,000 GtC 0.1 0.7 0.1 75% Gbl H L
O4.3 cf. O4.1 but maximum emission reductions 4,47 1,000 GtC 1.8 3.0 0.4 59% Gbl H L
Subjective assessments of spatial coverage globally, regionally and nationally, and sample coverage of full potential set of indicators: high (H), medium (M), low (L) coverage, or unknown (?) if insufficient data 
exist to assess coverage. See Supplementary Information for all data and explanations, as well as additional output indicators . †For each category of technology (supply, end-use, other), the indicators describe the 
proportion of all benefits generated by that category of technology divided by the proportion of all costs incurred by that category of technology so that proportional benefits are normalised to proportional costs. 
Gbl = Global. Gbl* = Global with English-speaking language bias77 .Benefit:cost ratio (B:C ratio). .
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end-use e"ciency. We draw the same conclusion about the relative 
underinvestment throughout the innovation system in end-use 
technologies, in the US, the EU, and elsewhere.
Although we have focused on the supply–end-use dichotomy, there 
are other potential tensions within directed innovation e$orts. #ese 
include: radical versus incremental innovation7,46, centralized versus 
distributed generation73, near-term versus long-term outcomes71 and 
technology-push versus market-pull drivers23. Climate change miti-
gation is also not the only objective for technological change in the 
energy system. Energy security and universal access to modern, clean 
energy are other important global scale issues52. Inevitably, trade-o$s 
have to be made, but the analytical framework we have set out sup-
ports comprehensive, consistent and aligned innovation e$orts11.
A failure to tackle innovation systemically can lead to unintended 
or even adverse outcomes. #e magnitude of the innovation chal-
lenge for climate change mitigation also means narrowly focused or 
partial responses are wholly inadequate. E"cient end-use technolo-
gies should take their rightful place at the centre of directed innova-
tion e$orts and public resource allocations.
Methods
We compiled a set of indicators describing all the key elements of our 
analytical framework for the innovation system (see Fig. 1). Using 
indicators to characterize innovation systems is well established, for 
example, to distinguish innovation inputs from outputs3,74 or to map 
changes over time in key innovation system functions75,76.
For each indicator, we contrast the proportion of e$ort directed 
at energy-supply and energy end-use technologies, in each case 
distinguishing innovation system inputs from outputs (following 
ref. 74). To minimize categorization bias, we include a third ‘other’ 
category for technologies that link supply with end-use. ‘Other’ 
technologies include grid and network infrastructure, electricity 
storage and distributed forms of electricity and heat generation. 
(All data and explanations for the indicators are provided in the 
Supplementary Information).
Our selection of the categories of indicator and the indicators 
themselves was designed to cover: all the elements of the innovation 
system represented in our analytical framework; the principal types 
of indicator referenced in the literature on energy innovation; and 
di$erent spatial scales, from national to global.
For each category of indicator, we provide a subjective 
assessment of the extent to which we sample from the full ‘indi-
cator space’, that is, the set of all possible indicators for the cor-
responding element of the innovation system. Our assessment 
distinguishes high, medium, low coverage and also unknown if 
insu"cient data exist to assess coverage. We assess spatial coverage 
as well as sample coverage.
As examples, we assess our ‘public RD&D investments’ category 
of indicator to have high spatial coverage as indicators are global, 
regional, national and include new data on the major developing 
economies (see Table 2). We also assess this category of indicator 
to have high sample coverage as the indicators describe all pub-
lic RD&D activities with no major omissions (but subject to data 
availability, see below).
In contrast, we assess our ‘analysis & modelling’ category of 
indicator to have medium spatial coverage as indicators are prin-
cipally global with only selected national data (see Table 2). We 
also assess this category of indicator to have low sample coverage 
as !ndings from less cited studies are omitted, particularly those 
outside the peer-reviewed literature.
We similarly provide a subjective assessment of both spatial 
coverage and sample coverage for all of the indicators within each 
category. #e indicators, as well as these subjective assessments of 
coverage, are summarized in Tables 2 and 3, with full details pro-
vided in the Supplementary Information
Our selection of indicators was heavily constrained by data 
availability, particularly for developing countries. As a result, some 
categories of indicator are biased towards developed countries, 
particular the US and the EU. #ese biases are re'ected in our 
assessments of spatial coverage. Global scale indicators describe 
both developed and developing countries, although energy-related 
innovation data for smaller developing countries are incomplete so 
may introduce an under-reporting error.
Collectively, our indicators provide a comprehensive and rep-
resentative account of directed innovation e$orts. However, we 
do not assume our indicators are directly commensurable, so 
we do not provide an aggregated descriptor. Rather, we present 
each of the indicators in their original units as their purpose is 
to describe succinctly particular elements of the innovation sys-
tem. Insu"cient understanding of the inter-dependencies between 
Knowledge - l1.1
Knowledge - l1.5
Resources - 15.7
Resources - 15.8
Resources - 15.1
Resources - 16.3
Institutions - 12.3
Institutions - 12.4
Institutions / resources - 13.1
Institutions / resources - 13.4
Institutions / resources - 14.2
Institutions / knowledge - 14.4
Adoption - 01.1
Adoption - 01.5
Adoption / knowledge - 02.1
Adoption / knowledge - 02.2
Adoption / outcomes - 03.2
Adoption / outcomes - 03.5
Outcomes / knowledge - 04.1
Outcomes / knowledge - 04.2
Energy supply technologies
Outputs and outcomes of the innovation systemInputs to the innovation system
End-use technologies
0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%
a b
Figure 3 | Technological emphasis of directed innovation e!orts. a, Inputs to the innovation system, for details of indicators see Table 2. b, Outputs and 
outcomes of the innovation system, for details see Table 3. Bars show two representatives for each category of indicator. Labels link indicators to elements 
of the analytical framework shown in Fig. 1 and summarized in Table 1. ‘Other’ technologies are not shown.
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these elements and their relative importance, compounded by data 
limitations, prevents a quantitative rendering of the innovation 
system as a whole.
Received 20 December 2011; accepted 11 May 2012; published 
online 26 October 2012.
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